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lations etc. It is argued that the European type of labour market institutions prevent
wage dumping and restrict major immigration flows to periods of business peaks in
the immigration country. Based on the empirical evidence on the differences in institu-
tions, it is argued for instance that the UK and Ireland are likely to be exposed to
larger wage effects than for instance Germany and Austria. Labour market institutions
are likely to grow more similar across countries and stricter as a consequence of free
mobility.
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1 Introduction
Already a quick look at the basic facts indicates that
there is great potential for immigration from the
new EU member countries (EU10) to the old ones
(EU15). First, the real wage differences are large:
the EU10 today have a real wage level that is ap-
proximately only 40 percent of the real wages of the
EU15. Though these differences are likely to dimin-
ish over time, they will nevertheless remain large
enough for migration to be an attractive option for
many years ahead. Secondly, the mere size of the
labour force in the EU10 is large enough, with ap-
proximately 50 million people, for the real wage dif-
ferences to trigger major labour movements. Finally,
the geographical distance implies very low costs of
labour migration.1
The potentially large migration flows have prompted
most of the EU15 to impose restrictions on labour
immigration from the EU10. But even if labour im-
migration were restricted for the maximum seven
years, the basic driving force of potentially large mi-
gration flows, i.e. large real wage differences, will
remain until free migration is a fact of life. The basic
issue that we discuss in this paper is how free immi-
gration from the new member countries will affect
the distribution of wages across regulated and un-
regulated sectors in the immigration countries, i.e.
in the EU15. We also discuss the conditions under
which the EU15 may experience large inflows of im-
migrants. The consequences of allowing free immi-
gration are likely to differ a great deal depending
on the labour market institutions of different immi-
gration countries. Immigration is also likely to lead
to changes in the structure of the labour market in-
stitutions across the EU15.
To understand the effects of immigration it is helpful
to distinguish between two types of labour market:
an unregulated “US-type” labour market and a reg-
ulated “European-type” market. If labour markets
are not regulated by collective agreements, job secu-
rity laws etc., not only will immigrants find it easier
to enter the country but, by underbidding, they will
also exert a downward pressure on wages. Facing a
1 Empirical estimates of future migration flows give widely diver-
ging results, particularly due to differences in estimation method-
ology (Alecke et al. (2001), Brucker (2001)) Sinn et al. (2001) and
Flaig (2001) forecast the long-term emigration potential from the
EU10 to be 6Ð9 percent of the emigration countries’ population.
As shown by Brucker (2001) and Alvarez-Plata et. al. (2003),
these figures fall to 2Ð2.8 percent when fixed effects are ac-
counted for. See also Bauer and Zimmermann (1999), Hille and
Straubhaar (2001) and Boeri and Brucker (2001). For a survey,
see Straubhaar (2002). Concerning the integration of previous
waves of immigrants from EU10 to EU15, see Tubergen (2004).
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potential fall in wages following immigration, it
could be hard to obtain political support for free
immigration and, for instance, US workers are in
general likely to resent free immigration from Mex-
ico.
In typical European labour markets, immigrant
workers cannot underbid, at least not below the
minimum wage stipulated in the collective agree-
ments. Moreover, job security laws prevent employ-
ers from substituting cheap immigrant workers for
expensive native workers. As these institutions pre-
vent wage dumping and crowding out, political sup-
port for free immigration from low-wage countries
is more easily gained.2 The resistance to free immi-
gration in the EU that we observe emanates prima-
rily from the representatives of sectors where col-
lective agreements are uncommon, union coverage
is low, and where employers are not subject to job
security laws etc.
It is argued here that the institutions of European
labour markets then act as regulators of immigra-
tion. In particular, since wages are downwardly
rigid, immigrant workers’ lower wage demands can-
not be used to enter the country, and large-scale im-
migration will occur only during business peaks.
Only when the labour market is characterised by
over-employment, an abundance of vacancies and
tendencies for wage drift, will there be chances for
a large number of immigrant workers to enter.
Another important institution is the job security
laws that prevent employers from substituting cheap
immigrant workers for expensive native employees.
Other institutions of importance for immigration are
also discussed, including competition regulations in
the different EU countries. These regulations largely
determine the extent of immigrant workers as entre-
preneurs in the immigration country. The trade un-
ions’ ability to keep up labour standards may also
regulate immigration. If immigrant workers find it
unfeasible to compete for jobs by underbidding wa-
ges, they might find it possible to enter the present
EU members’ labour markets by accepting poorer
working conditions than native workers. This would
be more common in sectors where unionisation is
low. Hence, the rate of unionisation is likely to be a
major determinant of immigration.
We also discuss the extent of institutions that may
prevent immigration across the EU. The opening up
2 Wage dumping is hard to define exactly but here we refer to it
as a significant drop in wages. Underbidding need not necessarily
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of the labour markets to free immigration is ex-
pected to enhance the trade unions’ incentives to
regulate the labour market so as to prevent wage
dumping. Thus, eliminating the international obsta-
cles to free mobility could lead to more national ob-
stacles. Moreover, if immigrants from the new mem-
ber states find it easier to enter the less regulated
countries of the EU, such as the UK and Ireland,
and wages fall as a consequence, we should expect
labour market institutions to become more similar
across the EU. Hence, institutional convergence is a
possible outcome of allowing free immigration.3
The paper is structured as follows. In the next sec-
tion we go through some simple theories of wage
setting and discuss how immigration is likely to af-
fect wages in an unregulated labour market and in
a regulated one. The effects of collective agreements
and job security laws on wage dumping are dis-
cussed as well as the extent of these institutions in
the EU countries. The discussion in this section
leads to the conclusion that large-scale immigration
to countries with regulated labour markets like
those in the EU mainly occurs in economic booms.
In section 3, we give evidence that the volume of
migration in free labour markets is largely deter-
mined by the business cycle of the immigration
(high-wage) countries.
2 Immigration to regulated and non-
regulated labour markets
2.1 A theoretical framework
The free mobility of labour of the European Union
means that the right to immigrate to another mem-
ber country is limited to people in the labour force
and to their family members. Normally, a wage ear-
ner will have arranged for a job already before arriv-
ing in the country of immigration. The conditions
that are necessary for workers in the new member
countries to have true access to vacancies in the
high-wage countries will, however, depend on the
labour market institutions in the receiving countries.
In this section we shall discuss whether these condi-
tions have negative effects on the host country.
Central importance in this respect is the role of the
wage formation institutions. To proceed, we con-
3 Our focus in this paper is on the labour market institutions and
wage differences across countries. This does not imply that we
wish to play down other factors that affect migration such as dif-
ferences in qualifications, language proficiency, preferences for
working and living in certain countries etc.
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sider two polar cases; one representing the free and
unregulated US-type labour market and another
representing the regulated European type labour
market characterised by collective agreements, job
security laws and more or less centralized wage set-
ting.
We shall present two well-known models and we do
this explicitly to stress the crucial differences of the
issue at hand. Let us consider first the well-known
and simple textbook case of an unregulated compet-
itive labour market. In Figure 1, panel a represents
labour demand (Dh) and supply (Sh) in a high-wage
country and panel b labour demand and supply in
a low-wage country (Dl and Sl). The wage w and
employment L are determined by the intersection
of supply and demand. Before the establishment of
free mobility we obtain a high wage wh
0 in the rich
country and a low wage wl
0 in the low-wage country.
As free mobility is established, the supply curve of
the poor country shifts to the left (panel b) while
the supply curve of the rich country shifts to the
right (panel a). This adjustment continues until wa-
ges are equalized across the two countries, i.e. at w*
yielding employment Lh* and Ll* in the two coun-
tries. Thereafter, no incentives for migration remain.
In this case, the real wage differences between the
high-wage and low-wage countries drive migration.
The basic assumption is that immigrant workers can
underbid the current market wage and, by using
workers’ competition for jobs, may enter the coun-
try and find employment. No native workers lose
their jobs, but since the wage drops the supply of
native labour may fall, thus reducing native employ-
ment to Lh* in the rich country. The extent of this
drop, of course, depends on the elasticity of the do-
mestic labour demand.
In this labour market, wages are set individually, and
not by unions and firms in negotiations, and the
price of labour is determined competitively. How-
ever, this simple textbook model, with the wage de-
termined by intersecting supply and demand curves,
is not a realistic description of wage setting in typical
EU countries. Labour is assumed to be homogenous,
which is a highly simplified assumption, and impor-
tant obstacles to migration such as the lack of lan-
guage proficiency are not accounted for. What is
more important is that there is no room for wage
bargaining, which in European countries determines
the negotiated wage increases.
A more realistic situation is one where the wage is
determined by the intersection of a demand curve,
also known as a price setting curve, and a wage set-
ting curve. Such a wage setting curve is obtainedPer Lundborg EU enlargement, migration and labour market institutions
from a union-firm bargaining model, which is the
dominating form of wage setting in European coun-
tries, as well as from an efficiency wage model. The
case is represented in Figure 2.4
Here, the wage and employment are determined by
the intersection of a demand curve, D , and a wage
setting curve, WS, i.e. at w* and L* . The point of
departure in the derivation of the wage setting curve
that is determined by bargaining is the union’s indif-
ference curve between wages and employment. The
curve is obtained by combining the indifference
4 For a more detailed analysis of this model, see for instance
Booth (1995).
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curves and the shifting labour demand curves and
it thus expresses the union’s preferences concerning
wages and employment. The curve tends to become
horizontal if the union prefers a high wage over em-
ployment and tends to be vertical when the union
prefers employment over high wages.
The bargained wage is then written into the collect-
ive agreement and underbidding which would lower
the wage below the agreement’s minimum wage
cannot occur. The bargained wage will normally be
set higher than the competitive wage and some un-
employment will occur.
A notable and crucial factor is that the unions are
assumed to maximise their native members’ utility.
This means that if the labour market is opened up
to free immigration from low-wage countries, the
potential immigration will not affect the wage rate.
The union will behave in the same manner as before
the labour market was opened up to immigration
and set the wage irrespective of the extent of poten-
tial immigration. Hence, the native workers that are
union members can be expected to act as insiders
keeping the outsiders, i.e. potential immigrants,
away from the labour market by means of strong
support for the collective agreements to prevent
wage underbidding.
The question is whether the behaviour of firms will
change due to potential labour immigration and
whether they will substitute cheap immigrant labour
for expensive domestic labour. The answer is no,
since in the sectors for which this type of wage bar-
gaining model applies, job security laws will prevent
employers from such substitutions.EU enlargement, migration and labour market institutions Per Lundborg
The extent of union-firm wage bargaining differs
across European countries. Also the wages that are
not formally determined by the social partners are
affected by the bargained wage. In many countries,
the coverage of the collective agreements goes way
beyond unionisation, implying that the minimum
wage stipulated in the agreements also applies to the
non-unionised labour force.
2.2 Collective agreements in the immi-
gration countries
If unions can easily demand collective agreements,
this will make it more difficult for employers to
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build up large firms based on immigrant workers be-
ing paid lower wages than their native colleagues. In
Sweden, for instance, it suffices that one employee
demands a collective agreement via union repre-
sentatives for the employer to be forced to sign and
thus pay the wage stipulated in the contract. The
coverage of the collective agreements thus becomes
an important factor when evaluating the potential
wage effects of free mobility. It is therefore of some
interest to look into the coverage of collective
agreements and union density in the EU countries.
In general, we should find that the higher the cover-
age of collective agreements is, the lower the risk
should be of immigration leading to wage dumping.Per Lundborg EU enlargement, migration and labour market institutions
Table 1 presents the coverage of collective agree-
ments and unionisation rates in the countries of the
EU15 and EU10.5 Of the EU15 countries for which
data are available, the United Kingdom stands out
as having the lowest coverage rate, at 36 percent. In
all the other countries the coverage is considerably
higher. At the top we find Belgium (100 percent),
Austria (98 percent) and Sweden (94 percent). Thus,
the United Kingdom can be expected to be the
country most exposed to the risk of wage dumping,
while Belgium, Austria and Sweden would be the
least exposed. In the EU10, the coverage of collect-
ive agreements varies considerably from Lithuania’s
10Ð15 percent to Slovenia’s full coverage.
The unionisation rate is also of some interest as an
indicator of the strength of the trade unions. It is
not entirely clear what unions can do to prevent wa-
ges from falling when immigration occurs, besides
relying on collective agreements and job protection
laws. The local unions could prevent the abuse of
entrepreneur licenses and the deterioration of work-
ing conditions. Particularly for recently established
firms, there will be incentives to avoid collective
agreements and hire only low-paid immigrant work-
ers. The gains from hiring workers way below the
wage stipulated in the collective agreements may be
very large.
Moreover, it is not obvious that employees from
low-wage countries have incentives to demand that
firms sign a collective agreement. The reservation
wage may be very low for an immigrant and be de-
termined by the wage level in the country of origin.
Assume that a firm in the host country offers, say,
€ 15 per hour while the collective agreement stipu-
lates € 20 per hour and the wage level in the home
country is € 10. The immigrated employee might
think that the firm’s survival is threatened if forced
to pay € 20 per hour. Thus, to avoid being forced to
return to the home country and a € 10 wage, the
immigrant might refrain from demanding a collect-
ive agreement and would thus accept a wage of € 15.
It is worth noting that it is difficult for large firms
to avoid collective agreements. This implies that the
risk of the firm being forced to sign an agreement
grows dramatically as the number of employees in-
creases.
The number of small firms with immigrant workers
is likely to grow in industries where there are great
5 These figures are those reported in EEAG (2004) but figures
differ between studies. EIRO (2002) report different figures for
individual countries, but in general the figures for the coverage
of collective agreements are at similar levels in the two studies.
ZAF 1/2006 29
difficulties in organising labour. These are typically
construction firms, transport firms, restaurants etc.,
but also firms lacking scale economies. In such in-
dustries both domestic firms and firms from the low-
wage countries may become established and benefit
from the cheap immigrant labour. These firms may
be highly competitive compared with domestic firms
that pay their employees according to collective
agreements. Thus, small firms may be exposed to a
major increase in competition as a result of the free
immigration of labour. Trade unions are, however,
likely to demand that firms sign the agreements or
to lobby for legal amendments.
To a worker, the existence of such a collective agree-
ment is per se no guarantee against wage competi-
tion. If a firm is expanding, native job seekers may
be exposed to increased competition from immi-
grant workers whom firms can expect to have a high
productivity. In particular, highly skilled workers
may well compete with low-skilled workers in the
immigration country.
2.3 Labour standards
If individuals who want to immigrate find it hard to
enter the labour markets of the high-wage countries
by underbidding, they might compete by accepting
poorer working conditions. If an employer cannot
fill a vacancy due to poor working conditions, and
finds it unprofitable to improve the conditions, the
jobs can be offered to workers from other countries.
These cases need not only concern the working envi-
ronment, but also inconvenient working hours, high
risks of exposure to violence etc. In these respects,
too, unions have a great influence and in order to
avoid a general decline of working conditions, they
might lobby for more regulations. Trade unions
claim that the directives on the free mobility of ser-
vices could exert a downward pressure on working
conditions.
2.4 Product market competition
Free labour mobility also means that entrepreneurs
can set up firms in other member countries. In this
case one must consider that the reservation “in-
come” of entrepreneurs from the low-wage member
countries is considerably lower than that of entre-
preneurs in the immigration countries. A worker
who is unable to obtain a job in a high-wage mem-
ber country can obtain a permit to start a new firm
in the destination country, and there appears to beEU enlargement, migration and labour market institutions Per Lundborg
extensive misuse of such permits. These immigrated
entrepreneurs are likely to accept a return from
work that is way below what other entrepreneurs
obtain but still exceeds the return that they would
have obtained in their home country. Domestic en-
trepreneurs are likely to look upon this as a form of
non-loyal competition.
Difficulties in entering the labour markets of the
high-wage member states will probably encourage
workers to become entrepreneurs. There is also a
connection between job security laws and entrepre-
neurship. Countries like Italy, France, Germany and
Sweden could receive a large number of such immi-
grants. There the costs of starting up a new firm are
relatively low, and the fact that regulations make it
difficult to compete for job openings could mean
that quite a large number of people opt to become
entrepreneurs. Thus rules of competition in goods
market are of importance for the volume of immi-
gration, and the easier it is to set up a firm, the
larger the volume of immigration. A relatively high
level of immigration of entrepreneurs can be ex-
pected in industries such as construction, restaurants
etc. where small firms are commonly found. The pri-
ces of the goods and services may be put under pres-
sure in such sectors.
2.5 Job protection laws
As noted above, another labour market institution
of relevance in evaluating labour migration is job
security laws, which largely prevent the displace-
ment of native workers by immigrant workers. Such
laws are created because there are gains to both so-
cial partners. For employees, uncertainty is reduced
and for firms the laws can provide stable employ-
ment conditions that increase the employees’ confi-
dence in the firm. There could also be social benefits
as the laws raise the costs of dismissal and thus may
prevent firms from laying off workers when it is so-
cially desirable for them to be retained in the firm.
The laws can be looked upon as a tax on the reallo-
cation of the workforce. They force firms to adhere
to certain rules and to pay for redundancies in a
business downturn. In a business upturn, firms can
be less likely to hire workers other than when they
are certain to be able to retain the worker for a long
time. Concerning the free mobility of labour, the
laws imply some costs to the firms as they prevent
firms from substituting the present workforce with
immigrant workers who may be less demanding in
terms of wages and work conditions.
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Since job security laws may determine immigration
flows to some extent, it is of interest to investigate
how they differ across prospective immigration
countries in the EU15. Many of the laws were intro-
duced during the 1950s and 1960s, and in some
countries the recessions following the oil crises of
the 1970s further stimulated their introduction. Un-
der pressure from the extensive labour market prob-
lems of the 1980s and 1990s, the general trend was
towards deregulation, though some exceptions ex-
isted. Several of the countries that deregulated the
protection laws, such as Finland and Spain, opted
for more short-term employment and temporary
contracts. The introduction of free labour mobility
is another factor that may affect the extent of the
laws in the future.
The OECD (1999) evaluated the job protection laws
of the EU countries and ranked them according to
the degree of “strictness”. Of course, some of these
protection laws are more important than others in
preventing employers from substituting immigrant
workers for native ones. In Table 2 we have sepa-
rated the protection laws that may be considered the
most important ones when it comes to the protec-
tion of regular employment, and listed the degree of
strictness in fourteen of the EU15 countries (Lux-
embourg is excluded). For comparison, but without
ranking, we have also added three of the new mem-
bers in column 1. The rankings of the fourteen
EU15 countries are shown in parentheses.
Employers are exposed to a large number of costs
when employees are dismissed. First, there are pro-
cedural requirements before the termination of the
contract with the employee. A written statement of
the reasons for dismissal may be required, it might
be necessary to notify a third party and there may
be delays before notice can start etc. As shown in
column 2, in the late 1990s the Netherlands had the
strictest rules in this respect followed by Germany
and Portugal. The least strict rules are found in Bel-
gium, Denmark and the United Kingdom.
Secondly, there are requirements concerning notice
and severance pay. Such costs differ between blue-
collar and white-collar workers, where they are nor-
mally higher for white-collar workers. Column 3 lists
the OECDs evaluation and ranking of countries ac-
cording to these costs of dismissal. In the three
southern European countries Portugal, Italy and
Spain employers face the highest costs when it
comes to notice and severance pay. There are con-
siderably lower costs in this respect in Ireland, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, which are the
three EU15 countries at the other end of the rank-
ing.Per Lundborg EU enlargement, migration and labour market institutions
The fourth column shows the constraints imposed
on employers for unfair or unjustified dismissals. A
dismissal is considered unfair if the employer cannot
demonstrate previous effort to avoid dismissals or
when social considerations or job tenure, including
last-in first-out rules, have been neglected. Courts
may order reinstatement after unfair dismissals, or
compensation payments on top of severance pay. As
shown under “difficulty of dismissal”, Portugal, Italy
and Sweden are the countries with the strictest rules
in this respect, while the United Kingdom, Belgium
and Ireland are the countries of the EU15 with the
least strict rules.
In the final column is found the OECDs evaluation
of overall strictness of protection against dismissals.
Portugal, the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden and Ger-
many are the countries with the overall strictest
rules against dismissal. We should expect to find that
in these countries immigrants would have the great-
est difficulties entering the labour market by substi-
tuting a native worker. At the other end of the rank-
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ing we have the United Kingdom, Belgium, Den-
mark, Ireland and Finland, where immigrants are
likely to have the least difficulty entering. From this
perspective these countries are likely to be the ones
most exposed to labour market displacement follow-
ing immigration.
We may also note that the three listed countries of
the EU10, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Po-
land, have relatively strict protection against dis-
missal.
One should remember, however, that it may be very
difficult to determine whether the laws are lax
enough for labour substitution to occur. For in-
stance, in no EU country are employers allowed to
substitute an immigrant worker for an employed na-
tive worker without good reason. Even in Great Bri-
tain, with the least restrictive laws, the laws may be
strict enough to prevent such effects. The conditions
for lay-offs are strict in all countries and the basic
requirements in all countries are that an individualEU enlargement, migration and labour market institutions Per Lundborg
lacks the competence or simply that there is a work
shortage. As these rules make it difficult for employ-
ers to fire workers the probability that free worker
mobility should cause wage dumping and displace-
ment can be assumed to be low in all EU countries.
In many countries the job protection laws do not
prevent employers from replacing workers by firing
them in a business downturn and then employing
low-paid immigrant workers in a business upturn.
Some countries prevent this by last-in first-out rules,
implying that workers that have been laid off should
be the first to be re-employed. But also in the cases
when workers from the new member countries and
new entrants to the labour market may compete
with those previously employed, the latter have an
advantage in that the employers have better knowl-
edge about their productivity and the value of their
education.
The rules of the labour market are not static, how-
ever. Should one find that, as competition for jobs
increases, immigrant workers are preferred to native
ones, there may be demands for stricter rules.
Stricter labour market regulations may thus be a
consequence of the free movement and such chan-
ges can, of course, mean that the benefits of free
mobility are lost to some extent. Particularly in the
countries with less restrictive rules, trade unions
may find that employers can replace native workers
with low-wage immigrant workers. The unions are
then likely to demand stricter rules and in the immi-
gration countries there could then be tendencies to-
wards institutional convergence. Increased trade un-
ion cooperation will probably also lead to more sim-
ilar labour market institutions.
It needs to be stressed that labour market regula-
tions in Europe do not only differ in the respects
that we have discussed above. All countries have
their own specific labour-market features. A note-
worthy case is the works councils (“Betriebsräten”)
in Germany, which could have specific effects on im-
migration, but discussion of this would go beyond
the scope of the present paper. Moreover, the differ-
ent forms of pay, such as bonuses, piecework pay or
time wages and other forms are likely to make a
difference to immigration and the effects of immi-
gration.
The figures reported in Tables 1 and 2 are, of course,
not static but change over time. It should be recog-
nised that immigration may have a large impact on
the figures, an issue that we shall return to in a sec-
tion below.
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3 The consequences of regulations
on migration
Are there no circumstances when immigration could
occur under the present labour market regulations
in typical European countries? Indeed there are.
The wage (or wage increase) that the social partners
agree upon and which is stipulated in the collective
agreements will hold for a specified number of years
ahead. While the wage then will be downwardly
rigid, there are no restrictions on wages increasing
upwards. One can then imagine a business peak dur-
ing the contract period, which would allow for immi-
gration. If demand for labour increases, unemploy-
ment among native workers will go down and the
increased demand will tend to raise wages above the
bargained level (wage drift) and also stimulate im-
migration. Immigrant workers will enter the labour
market and reduce the wage drift.
Thus, our basic conclusion is that the labour market
institutions prevent underbidding so that large im-
migration flows only occur in business peaks. To
gain some empirical insight into this issue we con-
sider the changes in immigration flows in Sweden
during the period 1954Ð1975. At that time immigra-
tion to Sweden was heavily dominated by labour im-
migration rather than refugee immigration. In 1954,
Sweden and the other Nordic countries signed the
agreement of the free Nordic labour market. Fig-
ure 3 shows total gross flows of immigration into
Sweden 1947Ð1975.Per Lundborg EU enlargement, migration and labour market institutions
First, despite the large differences in real wages be-
tween Sweden and Finland and the fact that Finnish
workers had free access to the Swedish labour mar-
ket, we see that there are no large changes in immi-
gration when the labour market was opened up in
1954. This shows that it was not possible for large
numbers of immigrants to enter the Swedish labour
market despite the agreement of free mobility. Finn-
ish workers could not gain access by underbidding
and there were obviously not enough vacancies
available. Between 1947 and 1963 immigration var-
ied between 19000 and 33000 persons per year.
In the business peaks, however, Sweden was to be-
come a popular destination for immigration. In the
mid-sixties, Sweden experienced its first major busi-
ness upturn, which stimulated quite a considerable
inflow of immigrants. Unemployment then fell to 1.5
percent and many vacancies were available in
Sweden. In two years, immigration doubled from
around 27000 in 1963 to 50000 in 1965. It then fell
back to 30000 in 1967.
The largest immigration increase appeared in the
extreme economic boom of 1969 and 1970. Gross
immigration then rose to 64000 in 1969 and as much
as 77000 in 1970. This boom was followed by a
rather sharp increase in unemployment (to 2.5 per-
cent) and immigration fell drastically as the labour
market deteriorated. Immigration returned to the
more normal level of 29000 persons in 1972 and
1973, which again indicates a heavy dependence of
immigration on the business cycle. These changes in
labour supply indicate a major benefit from the free
international mobility of labour.6
Employers are also likely to favour native jobseek-
ers in periods when the labour market is overheated.
This is so since employers are more familiar with the
productivity of native workers and find it easier to
evaluate their education than that of the immigrants.
In particular, native workers’ language proficiency
could be a decisive factor in this context. Neverthe-
less, we should expect young workers, new entrants
and previous immigrants to face more labour mar-
ket competition from immigrants applying for jobs.
Therefore although regulations prevent mass immi-
gration, vacancies will arise which in some situations
can only be filled by immigrant workers. If, during
6 It is also worth noting that foreign workers and accompanying
family members had a high labour market participation rate and
that the immigrants were quite easily integrated into Swedish so-
ciety.
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a business peak, vacancies cannot be filled by native
workers, firms are likely to be able to fill many of
these vacancies with foreign workers who have the
right qualifications. According to this view, the ex-
tent of immigration will therefore be determined by
the business cycle. The smoothing of the business
cycle may represent one of the largest gains from
free labour mobility.
The labour market conditions of the immigration
countries are thus crucial and we will expect more
immigration the larger the number of vacancies and
the lower the number of unemployed. This means
that it does not make sense to try to quantify actual
immigration after the labour markets have been
opened up. Immigration will vary over the business
cycle and reach its maximum when the immigration
country enjoys a business peak. Also the business
cycle of other immigration countries will matter.
Of course, also in business downturns characterised
by low labour demand, there will be some demand
for specialised labour that native workers cannot fill.
It is hardly meaningful to speculate about the type
of workers from the new member countries that
might be demanded under the free mobility of la-
bour.
4 Concluding remarks
During the post-war period, most countries in west-
ern and northern Europe were immigration coun-
tries and the southern European countries supplied
the expanding manufacturing sectors with cheap la-
bour. To a large extent, immigration was driven by
the favourable business development. Thereafter
followed a period, generally starting in the early
1970s, of restricted labour market immigration,
which was in turn followed by a period of refugee
immigration. Today, the EU15 has entered a period
when immigration is characterised by free labour
mobility from a number of low-wage countries in
their geographical vicinity. Again, immigration will
to a large extent be determined by demand for la-
bour, and major flows are likely to occur mainly dur-
ing business peaks. Moreover, the demographic
problems facing the European countries imply that
demand for labour in the public sector may act as a
driving force to unemployment and may determine
much of the migration flows during the next 30 to
40 years. If demand for labour in the public sector
increases as a consequence of the demographic
changes, immigration is expected to give rise to a
more stable development of wages than otherwise
would have been the case.EU enlargement, migration and labour market institutions Per Lundborg
In this paper we have argued that, in regulated la-
bour markets, large immigration flows are likely to
occur only during business peaks. In other periods,
European labour market institutions will prevent
wages from falling and immigrants from entering the
labour market by means of underbidding. Collective
agreements, job security laws and competition regu-
lations should contribute to this development of low
immigration. During business peaks, however, things
are different. At full employment, only immigrated
jobseekers can fill the remaining vacancies. The ma-
croeconomic benefits are obvious and appear in
terms of less wage drift and smoother business cy-
cles. If immigration occurs in business peaks and
wage dumping is avoided, the integration of foreign
workers should not constitute a major problem. This
implies that the risk of social problems following en-
largement should, in general, be quite limited.7
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